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Due Process and the Harsher Penalty After Appeal:
WARRANTED EXTENSION

OF

AN UN-

Pearce-Wood v. Ross

At common law there was no "right" to an appeal.' Such a "right" could

only be established by legislative enactment.2 The statutes creating a right
to an appeal brought with them the problems of determining the constitutional protections that must be afforded this right. Much controversy has
centered around one such problem, that of the constitutionality of imposing
a more stringent sentence on a defendant after he has successfully appealed
and attained a new trial.'
In the companion cases of Wood v. Ross and Rice v. North Carolina,'

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was faced with
resolving this question. In these cases, both individuals were convicted in
courts not of record and each exercised his statutory right to appeal, which
provided for a trial de novo in a superior court. Both were given harsher
sentences on appeal.5 These defendants contended that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented the augmenting of punishment on appeal beyond the penalty imposed at the first trial. The Fourth
Circuit relied on the reasoning of the North Carolina v. Pearce6 decision

and found that these defendants were denied due process of law.'
1See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894) (dictum). See generally North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(dictum,
dissenting opinion); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (dictum).
2
See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894) (dictum).
3
See, e.g., Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 978 (1967); Honigsberg, Limitations Upon Increasing
a Defendants Sentence Following a Successful Appeal and Reconviction, 4 Cium. L.
BuLL. 329 (1968); Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the
"Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YArz Lj.606 (1965); Note, The Chilling Effect
in Constitutional Law, 69 CoLuM. L. REv. 808 (1969); Note, Constitutional Law:
Increased Sentence and Denial of Credit on Retrial Sustained under Traditional
Waiver Theory, 1965 DuKE L.J. 395 (1965); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73
HAtv. L. REV. 1595 (1960); Note, Retrial of the Successful Critinal Appellant:
Harsher Punishment and Denial of Credit for Time Served, 28 MD. L. REv. 64
(1968); Comment, Criminal Procedure-ConstitutionalLimitations on Imposition of
More Severe Sentence after Conviction upon Retrial, 58 Ky. L.J. 380 (1970); Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968);
Comment, Increased Sentence Upon Retrial, 25 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 60 (1968);
80 HARv.L. REv. 891 (1967).
4F.2d - (4th Cir. 1970).
6 Wood received a 2 year sentence in the initial proceeding, and a 10 year sentence
on appeal, which was later commuted by the Governor of North Carolina to a 5 year
term. Rice received a 9 month sentence in the initial trial, and a 2 year sentence on
appeal.
6 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
7Id. at 726.
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The majority of courts that have been faced with the problem of increased sentences after retrial have held or indicated that it is constitutionally permissible to impose such a sentence.' The reasons' often cited
in support of this view are: (1) the defendant assumes the risk by seeking
a new trial;1" (2) a new trial completely nullifies the first trial and, in
effect, wipes the slate clean;" and (3) harsher sentences could act as deterrents to frivolous appeals. 2
Other courts have prohibited increased punishment subsequent to a new
trial brought about through an appeal. 3 The reasons cited in support of
this view include the constitutional objections that the defendant would be
8 See Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177
U.S. 155 (1900); Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1017 (1970); United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1052 (1968); United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967); King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291
(D.C. Cir. 1938) (dictum). See generally Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 978 (1967); Note,
The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808 (1969).
9 See generally Comment, Crininal Procedure-ConstitutionalLimitations on Imposition of More Severe Sentence after Conviction upon Retrial, 58 Ky. L.J. 380
(1970) for a more thorough discussion of the different views and justifications surrounding this increased sentence problem.
'oSee Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); Mann v. State, 23 Fla. 610,
3 So. 207 (1887) (dictum); Hobbs v. State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238, cert. denied,
375 U.S. 914 (1963); Hicks v. Commonwealth, 345 Mass. 89, 185 N.E.2d 739 (1962),
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 839 (1963)
(dictum); Sanders v. State, 239 Miss. 874, 125
So. 2d 923 (1961); State v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 1005 (1965); Commonwealth v. Alessio, 313 Pa. 537, 169 A. 764 (1934);
Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 978 (1967).
"lSee Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (dissenting opinion); Stroud
v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378
F.2d 808 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967); United States v. 'Valker, 346
F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965); King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Note,
Constitutional Law: Increased Sentence and Denial of Credit on Retrial Sustained
under Traditional Waiver Theory, 1965 DuKE L.J. 395 (1965).
12See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (dissenting opinion); Royals v. City of
Hampton, 201 Va. 552, 111 S.E.2d 795 (1960). See generally Whalen, Resentence
without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws, 35 MINN. L.
REv. 239 (1951); Comment, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions:
A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453 (1960).
13See Rush v. State, 239 Ark. 878, 395 S.W.2d 3 (1965)
(dictum); Sneed v. State,
159 Ark. 65, 255 S.W. 895 (1923); People v. Ali, 66 Cal. 2d 277, 424 P.2d 932,
57 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1967); Application of Ferguson, 233 Cal. App. 2d 79, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 325 (1965); People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr.
77 (1963); State v. Wolf, 46 N.J. 301, 216 A.2d 586 (1966). See also State v. Turner,
247 Ore. 301, 429 P.2d 565 (1967); Van Alstyne, supra note 3; Note, The Chilling
Effect in ConstitutionalLaw, 69 COLuM. L. REV. 808 (1969).

1971]

RECENT DECISIONS

denied equal protection of the law,"' would be subjected to double jeopardy,"5 or would be deprived due process of law. 6 Another argument, closely
related to that of due process, involves the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. 7
A few courts have reached a middle ground in this controversy, holding
that an increased sentence upon a new trial is permissible and constitutional if certain safeguards are present. 8 Such a holding was rendered by
the United States Supreme Court in the case of North Carolinav. Pearce.9
Pearce was convicted in a superior court of assault with intent to rape.2"
He was retried and again convicted.2 The second sentencing resulted in a
harsher overall punishment.2" Pearce obtained a writ of habeas corpus, and
the District Court held that the greater sentence was unconstitutional. 2
14 See Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 905 (1968); Whaley v. North Carolina, 379 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1967). But see

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
15 See Rush v. State, 239 Ark. 878, 395 S.W.2d 3 (1965); Sneed v. State, 159
Ark. 65, 255 S.W. 895 (1923); People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677,
35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963); Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 978 (1967). But see North Carolina
v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
16 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636
(4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968); Whaley v. North Carolina, 379
F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1967); Honigsberg, supra note 3, at 335, 341; Van Alstyne,
supra note 3, at 623. But see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), which stated
that the threat of increased punishment on appeal would not be a denial of due process
if certain safeguards were present.
17See Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 905 (1968); United States v. Walker, 346 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1965). See generally
Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 614; Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1595 (1960).
18See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); United States v. Coke, 404
F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. White, 382 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1052 (1968); United States ex rel. Starner v. Russell, 378 F.2d

808 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967); Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d
583 (1st Cir. 1967).
19 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
20 Pearce was convicted in the Superior Court of Duraham County, North Carolina,
and sentenced to a term of 12 to 15 years.
21After serving several years of this term, Pearce initiated post conviction proceedings on the ground that an involuntary confession had been admitted into evidence against him. A new trial was awarded. State v. Pearce, 266 N.C. 234, 145
S.E.2d 918 (1966).

-2The second trial judge imposed a sentence of 8 years, which, when added to
the time already served, amounted to a longer sentence than the 12 year minimum
originally imposed. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v.
Pearce, 268 N.C. 707, 151 S.E.2d 571 (1966).

23The court relied on the then recent Fourth Circuit decision, Patton v. North
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed," as did the United States
Supreme Court.25 The Court, after discounting the equal protection " and
the double jeopardy arguments," relied heavily upon the due process
guarantees.28 The Court stated that certain requirements must be met before
a defendant could be subjected to a harsher sentence.29 Such a sentence
could only be imposed if the reasons for the increased punishment were
based on the conduct of the defendant occurring after the time of the first
trial, and only if these reasons were recited by the judge in the record.
The Wood court relied on Pearce and stated that since there was a "lack
of proof of intervening deportment"" on the part of the defendants, and no
factual data in the record to justify an increased sentence, the defendants
were denied due process of law when they received a harsher sentence on
appeal. Such would be the logical conclusion if the Pearce rule were applicable to the instant case. However, it is distinguishable on several major
fronts. In Pearce, the superior court had original jurisdiction, while in
Wood, the superior court's jurisdiction was derivative.2" In Pearce, the
second trial was a retrial in the same court but in Wood the second trial
was a trial de novo in a higher court. 2 The most notable distinction beCarolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968), and held
the increased sentence unconstitutional.
24 397 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1968).
2 Certiorari was granted, 393 U.S. 922 (1968), and in 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the
Court affirmed the District Court decision. However, the Court modified the Patton
decision, and allowed increased sentences on appeal if certain safeguards or conditions were present.
26 395 U.S. at 722-23.
27 Id. at 719-21.
28 Id. at 723-26.
2
9Id. at 726.
30 F.2d -, - (4th Cir. 1970).
31 Pearce was charged with a type and degree of crime in which the superior
court had original jurisdiction. However, the superior court in Wood could only
derive its jurisdiction from a statute. Original jurisdiction in Wood was vested in
a non-record court.
32 The court in State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970), which
involved a legal issue identical to the issue in Wood, distinguished Pearce and discussed the differences between a retrial in the same court and a trial de novo in a
higher court. These differences were emphasized through a comparison of the
composition and operation of the non-record courts and the superior courts. The
court stated:
A district court makes no transcript of the evidence in the trial of a criminal
case. It is therefore impossible for a Superior Court judge, upon appeal from
a district court, to know what evidence and what facts affected the imposition
of sentence in the court below. Furthermore, in a criminal trial before a jury
in Superior Court more evidence is ordinarily presented and a more extensive
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tween the two decisions involved the type of appeal upon which each case
was based. The Pearce appeal was based on the fact that there was a constitutional error33 in the first trial which thereby effectively denied Pearce
a "fair trial.""4 The Pearce case held that this constitutional right to due
process" could not be unreasonably hampered. 6 The Court limited the rule
delineated in Pearce to new trials resulting from appeals based on constitutional and non-constitutional errors committed in the prior trial. 7 The
Court indicated that due process would require that the defendant in these
cases had a constitutional right to an errorless fair trial, and this right,
exercised through an appeal and retrial, could not be unreasonably chilled.3
The threat of an increased sentence on appeal would unreasonably deter
a defendant from seeking his right to such an appeal, and therefore, would
be a denial of due process. 9
The Wood decision is clearly distinguishable from Pearce in that Wood's
appeal was not structured on any type of error, but was based on an
absolute and unconditional statutory right to a trial de novo irrespective
of error.4" In Wood, the defendants merely appealed from an inferior
court to a superior court, not to achieve their right to an errorless fair
cross-examination is conducted. Thus the facts are more fully developed. The
Superior Court judge is generally a lawyer with extensive trial experience and
with a deep understanding with respect to proper punishment. Id. at 903.
33An involuntary confession had unconstitutionally been admitted against Pearce.
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 713 (1969).
34The right to a fair trial is a constitutional right based on and guaranteed by
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. It is often the
case that a defendant must appeal and be retried in order to receive a fait trial
(one free from constitutional error). See Van Alstyne, supra note 3, at 615.
85The right to due process includes the right to an errorless fair trial through
the use of an appeal, if necessary.
30 See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969).
37 Id.(emphasis added).
38The Pearce Court cited with approval language from its earlier holding in
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966):
This Court has never held that the States are required to establish avenues of
appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues
must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and
equal access to the courts. Id. at 724 (emphasis added).
Therefore, if Pearce is to be applied to the Wood case, then the question presents
itself-was the threat of an increased sentence an unreasoned distinction for this type
of right to appeal?
39
See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724-25 (1969).
4
oWood, unlike Pearce, did not have to prove error in his first trial in order
to attain an appeal. Wood was awarded an automatic appeal as a matter of right
under G.S. §§ 7-230 and 15-177.1 of the North Carolina Code.
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trial,' but rather to effectuate their right to a trial by jury.42 This type
of right to appeal is distinguishable in that here the defendant is automatically awarded a trial de novo, and is not obligated to prove error in
his first trial. It is a different type of right,43 suited for a different degree
of crime, 4 and subject to different requirements before it can be attained. 5
It logically follows that the measure of reasonable or unreasonable chill
to this right would also be different. When an appeal founded on this
type of right is taken to the superior court it is as if the case had been
41The defendants may have already been afforded due process of law if their
initial trials were errorless fair trials. This information, however, is not readily
ascertainable because, as their name indicates, non-record courts do not keep records.
42 See N.C. CODE G.S. §§ 7-230, 15-177.1.
43 The court in the Wood decision considered the "right" to appeal in the cases of
Pearce and Wood, and found no distinction. - F.2d at -. A closer inspection
reveals that the "right" to appeal in the case of Pearce was based on the concept of
right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, while the "right" to appeal in the Wood case was based on the right
to a trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth and Seventh Amendments of the Constitution
of the United States. These different types of rights have different functions and
different weights. The right to trial by jury seems weaker than the right to due
process in that this right, as it exists in state courts, is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Campbell v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 346 Mo.
200, 139 S.W.2d 935 (1940); Caudle v. Swanson, 248 N.C. 249, 103 S.E.2d 357 (1958);
White v. White, 108 Tex. 570, 196 S.W. 508 (1917). See Annot., 129 A.L.R. 324
(1940). There is substantial authority that the provisions of the Federal Constitution
which guarantee the right to jury trial do no limit the power of the states to abolish,
modify, or alter the right of trial by jury. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474
(1935); Southern R.R. v. City of Durham, 266 U.S. 178 (1924); Chesapeake & O.R.R. v.
Gainey, 241 U.S. 494 (1916). See generally 47 AM. JUR. 2d JURY § 9 (1969). There
are also numerous cases holding that a requirement of due process in a constitutional
provision does not require a trial by jury, and that such a due process clause does
not imply that all trials in state courts, affecting personal or property rights, must be
by jury. It has even been indicated that this is true of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which does not require a jury trial in a judicial proceeding
in a state court. 47 AM. JuR. 2d JURY § 11 (1969). It is conceded that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on states the requirement that
jury trials be available to criminal defendants, but the fact remains that the right to
trial by jury is distinguishable from the right to due process both in function and in
weight.
44Pearce did not have the same right to appeal that Wood had because each "right"
was contingent upon the degree of criminial activity in each case. The degree of
criminal activity alleged in Pearce was serious enough to afford a trial by jury in
the initial proceeding. In IVood, the degree of crime was less serious and the trial
was held without a jury, however, a statute provided an automatic right to appeal
to protect this right of trial by jury.
45 Pearce had to attack the initial proceeding and prove error before he could be
granted an appeal. Wood had only to request an appeal and he would be automatically
awarded a trial de novo.
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brought there originally and there had been no previous trial.' The judgment appealed from is completely annulled and is not available thereafter
for any purpose." Consequently, the defendant may be acquitted or he
may receive a weaker or harsher sentence than he received at his first
trial. 8
The First Circuit was recently faced with the identical problem that was
raised in the Wood case. 9 After considering and distinguishing Pearce,0
the court held that an increased sentence on this type of appeal was not
a denial of due process. The court considered the unreasonable chill
argument and noted the differences in the types of appeal and the rights
upon which each type of appeal was based.'t Pearce was held not applicable
to de novo trials resulting from appeals of convictions entered in non-record
courts. 52
The majority of cases that have relied on and followed the Pearce rule
46

See Lemleux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1017
(1970); People v. Olary, 382 Mich. 559, 170 N.W.2d 842 (1969); State v. Spencer, 276
N.C. 535, 173 S.E.2d 765 (1970); State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970);
Gaskill v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 486, 144 S.E.2d 293 (1965).
47See Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1017
(1970); Doss v. North Carolina, 252 F. Supp. 298 (M.D.N.C. 1966); Spriggs v. North
Carolina, 243 F. Supp. 57 (M.D.N.C. 1965); People v. Olary, 382 Mich. 559, 170
N.W.2d 842 (1969); State v. Anderson, 5 N.C. App. 614, 169 S.E.2d 38 (1969); State v.
Meadows, 234 N.C. 657, 68 S.E.2d 406 (1951); State v. Goff, 205 N.C. 545, 172 S.E.

407 (1934).
This type of appeal so completely annuls the first judgment that it is reversible error'
if such judgment is introduced into evidence at the trial de novo. See Harbaugh v.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 695, 167 S.E.2d 329 (1969); Gaskill v. Commonwealth, 206 Va.
486, 144 S.E.2d 293 (1965).
4s See note 46 supra.

49 The problem in Wood and in this First Circuit case involved the constitutionality
of an increased sentence after an appeal from a non-record court through a statute
that afforded an automatic right to a trial de novo. See Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d
353 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1017 (1970).

0414 F.2d 353, 355 (lst Cir. 1969).
The First Circuit distinguished the different types of rights to appeal in the
Pearce case and in the instant case and concluded that although the defendant's right
to appeal in the case at bar was being chilled, it was not being unreasonably chilled
because there were legitimate state objectives involved which would justify the threat
of increased sentence on appeal. Id. at 355-56. The court stated:
Here we deal with a two-way street. Defendant has the benefit of two full
opportunities for acquittal. If he fails to gain acquittal in the district court, his
mere exercise of his right to "appeal" not
gives him a new trial but vacates
the judgment and removes the entire case to the Superior Court. The state is
willing to accept this in the long run interest of reducing the load on the
Superior Court. The defendant need not accept it at all. If he does accept it.
both he and the state start at parity. Id. at 355.
52 See Id. at 355, 356.
51
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have been cases similar to Pearce in that they all involved some type of
error in the first trial.53 Noticeably, the majority of cases that involved
appeals not brought on error but rather on a statutory right to a trial de
novo, have not followed or relied on Pearce."' Many of these cases have
actually stated that Pearce was not applicable to cases involving this type
of appeal. 5 Even the Pearce decision indicates that it is only applicable
to cases involving appeals brought about because of an error in the first
trial. 6 The Wood case represents the small minority that holds the Pearce
rule applicable to cases involving de novo trials from non-record courts."
Wood represents an erroneous, unwarranted, and dangerous extension of
the Pearce doctrine.5" Such an extension of Pearce not only completely
defeats the purpose of the lower court system, but it makes these courts an
impediment to the administration of justice.59
The court in Wood relied entirely on the due process argument of
Pearce.6" They did not concern themselves with the unreasonable chill
5 See Barnes v. United States, 419 F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v.
Gross, 416 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. King, 415 F.2d 737 (6th Cir.
1969); United States v. Kienlen, 415 F.2d 557 (10th Cir. 1969); United States v. Wood,
413 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1969); Pinkard v. Neil, 311 F. Supp. 711 (M.D. Tenn. 1970);
Sefcheck v. Brewer, 301 F. Supp. 793 (S.D. Iowa 1969).
54
See Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1017
(1970); People v. Olary, 382 Mich. 559, 170 N.W.2d 842 (1969); State v. Spencer,
276 N.C. 535, 173 S.E.2d 765 (1970); State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 173 S.E.2d 897
(1970); Evans v. City of Richmond, 210 Va. 403, 171 S.E.2d 247 (1969).
55 See note 54 supra.
5 6
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969). Admittedly, there could be
an error in the proceedings in the court not of record, but the Wood type of appeal
is not granted because of any possible error, it is granted to afford the defendant the
right to a jury trial, irrespective of error.
57 See Love v. Winston, F. Supp. - (E.D. Va. 1971); Bronstein v. Superior
Court, 106 Ariz. 251, 475 P.2d 235 (1970); State v. Shak, - Hawaii -, 466 P.2d 420
(1970).
5SThis extension has been justified by holding it to be within the "spirit" of
Pearce. Bronstein v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 251, 475 P.2d 235 (1970).
59The First Circuit in Lemieux v. Robbins, 414 F.2d 353 (1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1017 (1970), and the Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Sparrow,
276 N.C. 449, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970), considered the ramifications of such an extension
and concluded that such a rule would either encourage defendants to appeal in every
case, thereby rendering trials in these courts a worthless exercise, or would encourage
lower court judges to impose maximum sentences out of caution, in the interest of the
state. Either alternative would encourage appeals in all cases. Defendants would have
everything to gain and nothing to lose, and their appeals would flood the superior
court creating a workload that would involve retrying every case that the lower
courts had previously tried.
60The court did raise the double jeopardy argument in the Wood case, however,
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argument,61 and they gave only superficial recognition to the more appropriate argument of double jeopardy.6 2 They relied solely on the due process
argument even though they were cognizant of the blatant distinctions between Pearce and Wood concerning due process. 6 After giving recognition

to the "logical and persuasive argument" espoused by the First Circuit, the
Wood court disregarded this logic and persuasiveness with the profound
statement, "[w]e simply disagree." 6 Hopefully, such an irrational result will
not become pervasive.
D.C.E.

it must be remembered that this case was considered along with the Rice case. There
was no double jeopardy issue in Rice, therefore, to effectuate the holding the court
reached, it was necessary to base it entirely on the due process argument of Pearce.
10The court did not discuss the unreasonable chill argument because the court
found no distinction in the types of rights upon which the Pearce and the Wood
appeals were based. The court assumed the "rights" were the same and concluded
that the rule would be the same, therefore a discussion of what might be an unreasonable
chill was unnecessary.
6 The Wood and Rice cases should have been considered separately, and not as
companion cases. Rice was simply retried for the same crime and given an increased
punishment, but Wood was retried for a higher degree of crime on his appeal. The
double jeopardy argument had merit and should have been more thoroughly pursued
in the case of Wood. The double jeopardy clause precludes the conviction of a
defendant for a higher degree of crime after he has secured a reversal of the conviction
of the lower degree. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). See also
Annor., 12 AJ..R.3d 978 (1967); Annor., 61 A.L.R.2d 1141 (1958).
The court stated they were cognizant of the Lefeux and Evans decisions, therefore,
they were aware of the distinctions in the types of appeals involved in those cases
and the Pearce case. However, the court chose not to see the distinction in the
"rights" to these appeals and failed to realize that the type of "right" to appeal dictates
the amount of chill that would determine if due process had been afforded or denied.
64Wood v. Ross, - F.2d -, - (4th Cir. 1970).

